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Non Technical summary 
This paper focuses on the determinants to optimal capital structure among different 
financial systems. Recent theoretical research on endogenous technological change 
stresses the it is entrepreneurial selection and the financing of tangible and intangible 
investment that lead to innovation. This research points out that policies that can 
improve the efficiency and costliness of financial markets, as well as extend their size 
exert a first-order influence on economic growth.  
There are two archetypes of financial systems. Today the U.S and the U.K. are the 
best empirical examples of arm’s-length systems (equity or market dominated 
systems), while Scandinavian countries, and most continental European countries are 
typically the relation-based systems (debt or bank dominated system). Comparing 
Sweden, U.K and U.S shows that the two Anglo-Saxon countries have 50-100 percent 
more equity financing than Sweden depending on measure used, while the ratio of 
debt to sales is highest in Sweden.  
The empirical results in this study are based on a panel data set of corporations listed 
at the Stockholm Stock Exchange for period 1991 to 1998. Regression results based 
on Swedish listed company data are compared with those from two previous studies 
(for U.S firms and U.K firms) and for small non-listed Swedish firms respectively. 
All these studies used the same econometric framework and similar data sets.  
The empirical approach is a dynamic specification allowing for adjustment of the 
capital structure over time. An important finding in the paper is that unlike in the U.S. 
case, the financial market in neither Sweden (bank dominated) nor U.K. (equity 
dominated) does favor a dynamic development of the economy driven by 
technological change. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper incorporates the cost of adjustment between observed and optimal 
leverage in explaining the variation in firm’s equity or bank-debt financing 
investments. Using a dynamic adjustment approach identifies the determinants to 
capital structure between different financial systems. In relation to firm sales U.K and 
U.S firms have 50-100 percent more equity financing than Swedish firms depending 
on which measure used, while the ratio of debt to sales is highest in Sweden. The 
major findings are that observed leverage often deviates from the target leverage in 
both equity and debt dominated systems. There are large and also unexpected cross-
country differences in determinants to optimal capital structure. Swedish and U.K. 
firms deviate more from the optimal level than U.S firms. A faster speed towards the 
target is observed in the equity based systems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Do particular financial institutions or their inefficiency have an impact on 
investments contributing to technological change, profitability and growth? While 
Miller and Modigliani (1958) derived conditions under which capital structure is 
irrelevant, an extensive body of subsequent theoretical contribution has convincingly 
shown how a firm can change its value and growth rate and improve future prospects 
by varying the optimal ratio between debt and equity.  
Empirical research on how market failure can drive a wedge between various 
sources of financing investment in R&D, structure, equipment and other investments 
(i.e., why all available information is not reflected in the prices of various securities) 
have mostly been explored within rather than between financial systems. Yet the 
rarely existing cross-country comparisons often take the industry level perspective. 
Moreover, the common approach in empirical capital structure research has been to 
study the association between the observed leverage and various explanatory 
variables.  But using the observed level does not take into account the fact that firms 
typically are not the optimal level. 
This paper focuses on the determinants to optimal capital structure between 
different financial systems. Recent theoretical research on endogenous technological 
change stresses the entrepreneurial selection and the financing of tangible and 
intangible investment that lead to innovation. Se King and Levine (1993), Aghion and 
Howitt (1998), Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Hall  (2002). This research points out 
that policies that can improve the efficiency and costliness of financial markets, as 
well as extend their size exert a first-order  influence on  economic growth. 
 There are two archetypes of financial systems. Today the U.S and the U.K. are 
the best empirical examples of arm’s-length systems (equity or market dominated 
systems). Sweden, other Scandinavian countries, and most continental European 
countries are typically the relation-based systems (debt or bank dominated system). In 
arm’s-length systems stock markets, bond financing and retained earnings are the 
dominating forms of financing. Bank-loans serve mainly short term purposes. The  
relation based systems are characterized  by long-term bank loans as the major source 
of investment financing. The relationship between particular banks and particular 
firms is mostly long term, and in such relationship the bank’s risks are reduced 
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because of it’s supposed knowledge of the firm’s prospects. Comparing  Sweden, 
U.K and U.S shows that the two Anglo-Saxon countries have 50-100 percent more 
equity financing than Sweden depending on measure, while the ratio of debt to sales 
is highest in Sweden.  
The empirical results are based on a panel data set of corporations listed at the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange 1991-1998. The conventional factors determining capital 
structure as reported in recent literature have been incorporated in the model, and the 
regression results are compared with those from two previous ( for U.S firms and U.K 
firms, and for small non-listed Swedish firms respectively) studies using the same 
econometric framework and similar data.  
The empirical approach is a dynamic specification allowing for adjustment of the 
capital structure over time. This is in contrast to the common approach in empirical 
capital structure research. It is therefore possible to identify the determinants of 
optimal rather than observed capital structure. If firms have capital structures that are 
not at their target, and if they adjust their capital structure very slowly, it is an 
indication that any efforts to reach the optimal level are associated with both benefits 
and costs.  
The major findings are following. First, observed leverage if often different from 
the target leverage in both equity and debt dominated systems. Second, there are large 
cross-country differences in determinants to optimal capital structure. Third, Swedish 
and British firms deviate more from the optimal level than U.S firms do. Fourth, a 
faster speed towards the target is observed in the equity based systems. Fifth, large 
similarities are found between large listed firms and small listed firms within Sweden 
when the market value leverage for listed firms is compared with the book the book 
value for non listed firms. A sensitivity test shows that the explanatory power 
increases dramatically when the cost of adjustment is incorporated in the model.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical 
background and important evidence on the presence of market imperfections. Section 
3 presents the empirical model of capital structure. Sections 4 describe the data and 
variables used. Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes the main 
findings.   
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2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUNDS  
2.1 Financial systems and economic performance 
One branch of literature dealing with determination of the relative amounts of 
debt and equity focuses on the link between the financial sector, industrial structure 
and growth. The common sense in this research is that the efficiency of a financial 
system is determined by its ability to mobilize savings, reduce risk of loss through 
moral hazard and adverse selection, distribute and reallocate resources to their most 
productive users without high or transactions costs, boost innovation, and ultimately 
stimulate industrial dynamics and growth. See Rajan and Zingales (1998), henceforth 
RZ, for a discussion. 
 Of particular importance for the efficiency of a financial system is its capacity to 
channel resources to young firms and to knowledge intensive firms. Firms raise funds 
for new investments both internally from retained earnings and externally from the 
financial system through security issues. The corporate finance literature shows the 
presence of life cycle in the pattern of financing firms. Initially the demand for 
external funding is substantial, and decreases successively with the age of a firm. For 
a mature firm in a steady-state equilibrium the need for net external funds is limited.2   
RZ (2001) suggest that if the young firms are innovators, contributing to 
Schumpeterian waves of creative destruction, the development of the financial system 
is crucial for aggregate economic growth.  
Focusing particularly on entrepreneurial firms, a growing empirical literature 
provides evidence on financial constraints for small firms.  Analyzing 724 SMEs 
from all major sectors of the Finnish economy, Hyytinen and Toivanen find evidence 
that capital market imperfections hold back innovation and growth for small and 
middle-sized firms.  This finding is in line with results for other countries reported by 
Brown 1997, Bond, Harhoff, Van Reenen 1999, Bougheas, George and Strobl 2001. 
The most valuable assets of knowledge intensive firms are related to R&D and 
human capital. RZ (2001) suggest that such intangible investments are easier to 
finance on the stock market since collateral is essential to obtain external financing by 
issuing debt to the banking sector. From a Schumpeterian point of view this means 
                                                 
2 Among established firms the need of external net funds is associated to technological 
shocks raising the investment opportunities beyond retained earning can support.  
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that competitive advantage of an economy is closely associated with its supply of 
equity financing. Carlin and Mayer (1998) give support for this hypothesis when 
studying 27 industries in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-1995. They find 
positive correlation between equity financing, R&D-intensity, growth, and probably 
the very important factors of accounting standard.3 
It can be assumed that the access to external financing for young firms and R&D 
investments for small and large firms is not independent from the size of the financial 
sector. In their cross-country study King and Levine (1993) find that the financial 
sector size is positively correlated with macroeconomic growth. But measuring the 
size of a financial market, however, is a bit tricky, as reported by La Porta et al 
(1997). In order to account for this problem they present eight different measures for 
49 different countries, including Sweden and the two Anglo-Saxon countries that will 
be explored in this paper. 
Table 1 shows that the U.K and the U.S have much bigger capital markets 
measured as the sum of debt and equity than Sweden. Three indicator measures are 
used for the equity capital as shares of total economy, while one indicator is 
expressed as the ratio of bank debt in the bank sector and outstanding nonfinancial 
bonds to GDP. Individually and together these four measures indicate an extensive 
difference between Sweden and the two Anglo-Saxon countries. They have a larger 
stock market in relation to GDP, three times more listed firms per population in 
million, 50-100 percent more initial public offering given to the population and 60-
100 percent higher ratio of bank debt of the private sector to GDP. The lower part of 
the table displays external funding at the firm level. In relation to firm sales the U.K 
and the U.S have 50-100 percent more equity financing than Sweden depending on 
measures used, while the ratio of debt to sales is higher in Sweden than in the both 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Another information read from the table is that the Swedish 
capital market has about the same size as the capital markets in several other 
European countries. 
                                                 
3 Reporting similar findings as Carlin and Mayer, Beck (2001) uses  industry-level data on 
firms’ dependence on external finance for 36 industries and 56 countries  and concludes that 
countries with better developed financial systems have higher export shares and trade 
balances in industries that uses more external finance. But the identified key area for 
improving the financial system is mainly juridical and includes strengthening creditor rights 
and contract enforcement through judiciary and juridical reforms. 
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2. 2 Determinants to the optimal capital structure 
This subsection briefly reviews the literature on determinants to optimal capital 
structure, or debt equity choice. Taxes are the main reason for capital structure 
optimization. The advantage of corporate taxes in this respect is that interest 
payments are deductible as an expense. The consequence is that, ceteris paribus, the 
total income to both debt holders and stockholders is larger for a leveraged firm. 
Total income increases by interest payment times the tax rate. The optimal strategy 
for the value-maximizing firm would therefore be to acquire a maximum of leverage. 
The greater the amount of debt is, the greater the tax shield and the greater the value 
of the firm. But such a strategy is not consistent with empirical evidence. One main 
reason is related to the uncertainty of tax shields. The possibility of using tax shields 
effectively varies over the business cycle and among firms, depending on net income 
or profitability.  
Another reason for tax shelter redundancy identified by Van Horn (1992) is that 
firms use alternative ways other than interest on debt to shelter income, for example 
leasing, investment in intangible assets and the use of options and future contracts. 
Other non-debt factors that reduce the incentives to issue debt to take advantage of 
interest shields are depreciation and amortization. 
Bankruptcy costs are an intensively discussed important market imperfection 
affecting capital structure. With perfect capital markets, no bankruptcy costs are 
present since the firm’s assets can be sold at its economic value and no transaction 
costs are involved. If capital markets are less than perfect, the security holders receive 
less than they would in the event of bankruptcy. Van Horne (1992) reports that the 
possibility of bankruptcy usually is not a linear function of the debt-to-equity ratio. It 
increases at a growing rate beyond some threshold. 
 Information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders can effect the firm’s 
optimal capital structure. In financing new investment projects Myers and Majluf 
(1984), argue that well-informed management insiders will issue equity if they 
believe the existing stock is overvalued and debt if it believes the stock is 
undervalued. Razin, Sadka and Yuen (2001), however, draw the opposite conclusion 
and suggest that debt is preferred to equity since the choice of equity finance signals 
that the firm’s shares are overvalued.  
Titman (1984) argues that the more unique a firm’s assets, the thinner the market 
for those assets and the lower the expected value recoverable by the lender in the 
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event of bankruptcy. The idea is that a firm that develops and produces unique and 
specialized products also develops specialized or customized skills and competence 
capital that are not easily transferable. Consistent with this idea, Titman (1984) finds 
that firms in unique lines of business tend to be less leveraged. 
Among market imperfections reported in the literature, that prevent the 
equilibrium of security prices from being reached, there are transaction costs which 
restrict the arbitrage process, and institutional restrictions on lender and stock 
investor behavior, and moral hazard problems due to principal agent-conflict between 
the separated ownership and management, which can result in investment strategies 
that are not value maximizing.  
In addition to discussion on the over- or under valuation of stock prices, which 
can be applied on both profitability and growth opportunities, there are some more 
conflicting results that should be noted here. Larger firms are mostly diversified and 
fail less often. Size may therefore be an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy and should have a positive impact on debt. On the other hand, size may 
also be a proxy for the amount of information that is available to the people outside 
the firm. This is expected to increase the preference of firms for equity relative to 
debt.  
Jensen (1986) discusses the effects of profitability on leverage and predicts a 
positive correlation if the market for corporate control is effective, and negative 
otherwise. The negative relationship is explained by management’s preference for 
internal financing while efficient corporate control forces the firm to pay out cash by 
leveraging up.   
Does a conclusion of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence produce any 
robust evidence on determinants to optimal capital structure, which can serve as a 
guide in our subsequent analysis?  In their extensive survey Harris and Raviv (1991) 
report that literature generally agrees that leverage is supposed to increase with fix 
assets, non debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and firms size, while leverage is 
supposed to decrease with volatility, research and development expenditures, 
bankruptcy probability, profitability, uniqueness of the product and advertising 
expenditures.  
Investigating four determinants of capital structure choice by analyzing the 
financial decisions of public firms in all G-7 countries (the U.S., Japan, Germany, 
France, Italy, the U.K., and Canada), RZ (1994) differentiate between leverage 
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expressed in book value and in market value. They showed that both measures of 
leverage increase with tangibility (fixed assets divided by total assets) and sales, and 
decrease with profitability and (in conflict with Raviv and Harris) the market-to-book 
ratio as a proxy for growth opportunities.  In a cross-sectional analysis of a sample of 
176 large firms, Asgharian (1997) shows that growth, size, collateral value of the 
assets and managers’ shareholding positively affect firm leverage while profitability 
affects leverage negatively. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Dynamic models 
This study builds on dynamic modeling approach following a minor but growing 
trend in the literature. Jalivand and Harris (1984) were among the first to recognize 
the importance of a dynamic approach in finance theory in their study of the capital 
structure of firms. They characterized a firm’s financial behavior as a partial 
adjustment to long-run financial targets. Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) used 
adjustment dynamics when they studied the difference between the maximum and 
minimum debt ratios of firms over a sample period of more than 8 years and tried to 
identify the factors that determined the range of capital structures. Rajbhandary 
(1997) estimated a dynamic adjustment model exploring Indian firm data.  
Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (2000) represent one of the first attempts to apply a 
dynamic adjustment model and panel data methodology in capital structure analysis. 
The main finding is that firms typically have capital structures that are not at the 
target, and that they adjust very slowly towards the target. Their study highlights the 
issue of adjustment costs, which has been overlooked in previous literature. The 
KHH-model used in this paper is an extension and development of the Benjare at al 
model. 
The specification of the dynamic model here follows those outlined in 
Kumbhakar, Heshmati and Hjalmarsson (2002), in the following labeled as the KHH-
model, and Heshmati (2002). The principal idea in the model is that there is a trade-
off between the costs and the benefits of leverage, which implies an interior optimal 
debt level for a firm.  
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3.2 The optimal leverage ratio 
Assume that the optimal leverage ratio for a firm is a function of sets of variables 
as in the following equation: 
 
(2)  ),,(* tiitit XXYFL =  
 
where *itL  is the optimal leverage ratio for firm i, at time t, Yit is a vector of firm- and 
time-variant determinants of the optimal leverage, iX  and tX  are unobservable firm-
specific and time-specific effects represented by firm and time dummy variables. The 
distinguishing feature of the KHH model is that it allows the optimal leverage to vary 
across firms and over time. The dynamic of this model means that the optimal debt 
ratio may move over time for an individual firm.  
 
3.3 The adjustment process towards optimal leverage  
Under ideal conditions one would expect that the observed leverage of firm i at 
time t  is equal to the optimal leverage, i.e. *itit LL = . In the dynamic model this would 
imply that the change in actual leverage from the previous period to the current period 
is equal to the change required for the firm to attain optimal leverage at time t. If 
adjustments to the rate of change required for the firm to reach optimal leverage at 
time t are costly, as reflected in itL , then firms may not find it optimal to adjust fully, 
but only partially. This is represented as 
(3)  )( 1
*
1 −− −δ=− ititititit LLLL  
which can be rewritten as  
(4) itititititit eLLL +δ+δ−= ∗−1)1(  
 where itδ  is the adjustment parameter representing the magnitude of desired 
adjustment between two subsequent periods, and ite  is statistical noise assumed to 
have mean zero and constant variance.  
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If  itδ  = 1, the optimal adjustment is achieved within one period and the firm at 
time t is at its target leverage. The effects of adjustment costs are represented by the 
restriction that itδ <1, which is a condition that ∗→ itit LL  as t  goes towards infinity. 
Finally, if itδ  >1, the firm overadjusts by making more adjustments than necessary. 
Overadjustment is a reflection of unanticipated changes in economic conditions. 
 
3.4 The speed of adjustment 
The speed of adjustment itδ may itself be a function of some underlying 
variables affecting adjustment costs: 
(5)  ),,( tiitit MMZG=δ  
where itZ  is a vector of variables determining the speed of adjustment, and iM  and 
tM are unobserved firm-specific and time-specific effects. As with the optimal 
leverage, which may shift from period to period, the speed of adjustment is also 
allowed to vary across firms and over time. 
An important feature of the KHH adjustment model is that the current and past 
levels of optimal leverage contain information that can be used to predict the future 
behavior of leverage, and that it does not take into account the target leverage beyond 
time t. 
 
3.5 The general functional relationships 
Finally the assumptions of the general functional relationships for the optimal 
leverage ratio, ∗itL , and the adjustment parameter, itδ , in the KHH model is given by  
(6) t
t
ts
s
sjit
j
jit XXYL ∑∑∑ α+α+α+α=∗ 0  
(7)  t
t
ts
s
skit
k
kit XMZ ∑∑∑ β+β+β+β=δ 0  
where the firm-specific and time-specific variables iti MXX ,,  and tM , are replaced 
by industrial sector and time dummy variables. The α  coefficients are short-run 
elasticities. The long-run elasticities are calculated as ( LY jj /(δα ). The specification 
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of the model uses the determinant factors measured for the same period that ∗itL  and 
itδ  are determined. 
 
3.6 The estimation procedure 
The overall estimation procedure is starting by estimating the probability of the 
survival of firms. Using a probit model written as 
(8) ititit wz η+γ′=*   
The parameter estimates are used for calculating the inverse Mill’s ratio, introduced 
to correct for selection bias4, )ˆ/ˆ(ˆ ησγ′φ= itit wRM . Mill’s ratio, is then introduced as 
an extra explanatory variable in the optimal leverage equation (6), which is based on 
surviving firms, where itL  in equation (6) is observed only when the latent variable 
itz >0:  
 
(9) ititititititit eLLzL +δ+δ−=> ∗−1)1(0|  
 
Equation (6) in the general functional relationship can then be respecified as: 
 
(10) ititMRt
t
ts
s
sjit
j
jit eRMXXYL +α+α+α+α+α= ∑∑∑∗ ˆ0  
Where MRα  indicates the presence of a selection bias, while its sign and size indicate 
the direction and magnitude of the bias. Selection bias arises as a result of the exit, 
entry and non-response of firms. Since the model is non-linear in its parameters, the 
KHH model uses a nonlinear regression procedure. Explanatory variables include the 
vector of determinants of optimal capital structure Y (non-debt tax shields, income 
variability, expected growth, tangibility, size, profitability and uniqueness), and the 
vector of determinants of the speed of adjustment Z (absolute distance from optimal 
                                                 
4 The restriction imposed regarding the frequency of firms to be observed reduced the total 
sample of 1,179 observations to 813. Given the dynamic nature of the model, a firm must have 
been observed for at least three consecutive years. If firms with some sets of characteristics 
are more likely to be observed for three years or more, then the final sample is not randomly 
selected from the total sample and the estimates of the optimal capital structure may suffer 
from selection bias. 
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debt ratio, expected growth, size and profitability) and vectors of unobservable X and 
M (time and industry) effects.5 
 
4. DATA, VARIABLES AND SOME PREILIMINAY FINDINGS 
The observations used in the study relates to firms listed on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange during the period 1991-1998. The total number of annual observations 
varies between 117 and 221. Having specified the functional form in the previous 
section, we will now discuss measures of leverage and variables that determine the 
optimal capital structure and the speed of adjustment. 
 
4.1 Market and book values of leverage 
We will use two different definitions of leverage. In the first case the market 
value of equity and in the second case the book value of equity is used. The market 
value measure is essentially future-oriented, reflecting expected future cash flows 
from the tangible and intangible assets of the firm. The book value measure, on the 
other hand, largely reflects the performance history of the firm. 
Given that the objective of the firm is to maximize its value, it is not obvious 
whether the real value is best captured by a historical perspective or by a future 
perspective. Since the information signaled in book value and market value is 
informative in different respects, many previous studies have used both 
simultaneously.  However, our emphasize is on market value leveraged. This is 
motivated by the overall research issue on the impact of different financial system on 
the firms’ growth opportunities. 
  
4.2 Determinants of optimal leverage 
Our set of determinants to optimal leverage is derived from the discussion in 
Section 2.2, and they are mainly those that have commonly been documented in the 
literature as affecting a firm’s leverage. They are (1) Non-debt tax shields (the ratio of 
depreciation to total assets), (2) Income variability (the variance of sales), (3) 
                                                 
5 For the purpose of comparing results of the dynamic model with those based on static 
models, we will also estimate the simple static model:  
 
(11) ititMRt
t
ts
s
sjit
j
jit eRMDDYL +α+α+α+α+α= ∑∑∑ ˆ0  
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Tangibility (fixed assets divided by total assets), (4) Profitability (net profit), (5) 
Uniqueness (the average wage level), (6) Expected growth (the percentage change in 
total assets from the previous to the current year), and (7) Firm size (employment). In 
order to control for any time-specific and industry-specific effects that may not be 
captured by the variables above, we also include time dummies and dummies for 
different industry classifications of the firm. 
 
4.3 Determinants of the speed of adjustment 
The speed of adjustment towards the optimal capital structure is determined by 
the costs of shifting from one capital structure to another. Three explanatory variables 
are included in the regression that captures the adjustment speed, two of which are 
identical to variables that determine the optimal level of debt. The variables are 
distance, growth opportunity, firm size and unobservable firm-specific and time-
specific effects. We will explain them briefly in the following:  
Distance between observed and optimal leverage: If fixed costs constitute a major 
portion of the total costs of changing capital structure, firms with sub-optimal 
leverage will alter their capital structure only if they are sufficiently far from the 
optimal capital structure. The likelihood of adjustment is a positive function of the 
difference between optimal and observed leverage. The relationship between the 
speed of adjustment and distance from the optimal capital structure is supposed to be 
negative if leverage is adjusted slowly and internally via the firms’ dividend policy.  
The correlation is positive if the firms adjust their leverage in external capital markets 
when deviations are sufficiently large.  
Growth opportunity: Growth opportunity is the second of our determinants of 
optimal capital structure. The paper assume that the larger growth opportunities are, 
the faster adjustment towards optimal capital structure is since a growing firm may 
find it easier to change its capital structure by choosing among several alternative 
sources of financing.  
Firm size:  Firm size is expected to be positively correlated with the speed of 
adjustment. It can be assumed that larger firms may find it easier than small firms to 
change their capital structure by issuing debt or equity because more information is 
available about larger firms.   
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Unobserved firm-specific and time-specific effects:  In addition to the distance, 
growth opportunity and size variables, a set of time-dummy variables is included to 
capture unobservable time-varying effects that are common to all firms. They are 
supposed to capture macro factors like the general economic condition, interest rates, 
money supply and the labor market situation. 
 
4.4 Some preliminary findings  
The statistics for Swedish firms reported in Table 2 show that the ratio of the 
market value of equity increased dramatically between 1991 and 1998. While the 
market value in 1998 was 90 percent higher than in 1991, the 1998 book value of 
equity was only 12 percent higher than its 1991 level. These figures reflect in part the 
shift of the Swedish economy from its deepest economic recession since the 1930s to 
an economic boom, which peaked in the year 2000, as well as the strong increase in 
the international valuation of technological firms in general during the 1990s. In 
particular Telecom (Ericsson) have a strong impact on the performance of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
Table 3 supplements the information on heavily debt financed Swedish firms 
provided in Table 1. The average level of market value leverage for the listed firms 
was 53% between 1991 and 1998.6 The Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg balanced 
panel data we utilize on our analysis show that the average market value leverage is 
40% in the sample of the 483 listed firm in the U.S, observed between 1989 and 
1996, and only 14% in the sample of the 122 U.K. firms observed between 1990 and 
1996. The book value leverage is 26% for the U.S. firms and 14% for the U.K. firms.  
The number of annual observations in the unbalanced Swedish sample increased 
gradually from 117 in 1991 to 221 in 1998. About 70 percent of the observations 
represent firms with 251 or more employees. Eight different industry classifications 
are used in the study, with knowledge-intensive services being the largest group, 
including business services, bank, insurance, R&D firms and ICT firms.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This Section presents the cross-country and inter-country comparisons of the 
determinants to capital structure. The results are reported in Table 4-6.  First, the 
                                                 
6 Note that we define leverage as debt/debt + equity 
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Swedish parameter estimates7 are compared with results for U.K. and U.S. obtained 
from Banerjee, Heshmati and Wihlborg (2000) using market value leverage, the same 
econometric framework and similar data. Second, the parameter estimates of book 
value of leverage for firms listed at the stock exchange in Sweden are compared to 
book value estimates for Swedish non-listed small firms. The results from non-listed 
firms are taken from Heshmati (2002).  To broaden the discussion, book-value 
leverage estimates for the two Anglo-Saxon countries are also reported.  
 
5. 1. Cross-country differences in the determinants of capital structures 
A priori the differences in the determinants of optimal capital structures in 
Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. should be expected to have gradually shrunk in the 
1990s. The reason for this is deregulation of the financial industry – in the United 
States in the 1980s and in most other industrial countries, including Sweden in the 
1990s, lower international inflation rates and nominal interest rates, and the increased 
globalization of financial markets. 
5.11 Non-debt tax shields 
The main incentive for borrowing is to take advantage of interest tax shields. 
This advantage is reduced with the presence of non-debt tax shields such as 
depreciation and amortization.  
Using the ratio of depreciation to total assets in order to measure the existence of 
non-debt tax shields, a negative relationship between this variable and the optimal 
leverage should be expected in highly- leveraged Sweden, and a weak correlation or 
no correlation at all in the low-leveraged U.K. and U.S. This is also what the results 
                                                 
7 Initially two models were tested: a standard static model, and an unrestricted flexible 
adjustment dynamic model. For both, time dummy and time-trend specifications are 
estimated, and they are estimated using both market value and book value leverage. The 
static model assumes instantaneous adjustment and the adjustment coefficient δ  is 1. That is, 
there is no difference between the observed and the optimal leverage ratios. In the dynamic 
model the assumptions for adjustment imply that different firms have different speeds of 
adjustment towards their firm-specific optimal capital structure. The root mean squares error 
(RMSE) and the coefficient of determination (R2) show a large difference between the static 
model and the two dynamic models. The superiority of the dynamic models is illustrated by 
their lower RMSE, 0.07-0.09 compared to 0.14-0.18 for the static model, and higher R2, 0.81-
0.87 versus 0.34-0.40. A sensitivity test shows that the increase of explanatory power is mainly 
due to the introduction of a constant lag-dependent variable.   To save space the results from 
the static model and the sensitivity test are not reported in this paper. Please consult the 
author to receive the estimates. 
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presented in Table 4 show. The coefficient is highly significant and large, -3.79, for 
Sweden while it is negative but insignificant for the U.K. and positive but 
insignificant for the U.S. Contrary to Sweden this indicates limited or non-incentive 
to increase the leverage because of corporate taxes.  
5.12 Income variability  
The variation in a firm’s income is supposed to influence its optimal leverage 
negatively because the more variable a firm’s operating income, the greater the risk 
that the firm will be unable to cover its interest payments and the higher the 
probability of bankruptcy is. Since operating income represents the income available 
for interest payment and is independent of the effect of leverage, we use variance of 
sales to measure income variability.  
The coefficients are indeed negative in all three countries, although they are 
approximately zero and insignificant in Sweden and in the U.K. In the U.S. the size of 
the estimate is -0.34 but only significantly different from zero at the 10% level of 
significance. The surprisingly weak explanatory power of this variable might be due 
to the fact that the period of study partly coincided with a period of strong economic 
recovery in all three countries and a generally positive trend in revenues. 
5.13 Expected growth  
The literature on the impact of expected growth is conflicting and different 
proxies for this variable are perhaps one explanation to this result. Here the growth 
variable is defined as the percentage change in total assets from the previous to the 
current year. 
The parameter estimates for Sweden are weakly positive (0.02) and highly 
significant. The economic interpretation is that firms with a higher growth potential 
did make use of this situation to pay down debt and reduce their leverage, however 
only to a smaller extent. The growth coefficient for the U.K. shows the negative sign 
and the order of magnitude is rather large, -0.60, but insignificant.   
The both European estimates  can be compared with the U.S estimate, which 
shows a highly significant and large estimate (0.94). Perhaps this result can be 
explained by changes in financial regulation in the 1990s, encouraging the low-
leveraged firms with positive growth perspectives to begin to borrow more from 
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banks as a result of increased competition in this industry. Jayarante and Strahan 
(1996) give support for this interpretation. They found that deregulation leads to 
improvements in loan quality, which leads to better growth. An additional 
interpretation is that well-informed U.S. insiders believed that the existing stock was 
undervalued and consequently issued debt. Moreover, it may be an indicator of a 
strong signal value of intangible capital, which the American capital market seems to 
perceive better than European capital markets do. 
5.14 Profitability 
 It was previously assumed that promising future prospects on profitability 
should be expected to correlate negatively with leverage. But recent works on 
asymmetric information and signaling effects have found that the result depends on 
assumptions on over- or undervaluation of the existing stocks.  
The reported results show a negative, highly significant and large coefficient for 
Sweden (-2.66) and for the U.K. (-0.64), which can be interpreted in compliance with 
the undervaluation hypothesis.  The firms utilized the positive development at the 
stock markets during the 1990s to issue equity.  The U.S. parameter estimate, on the 
contrary, has positive sign but the coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  
5.15 Uniqueness 
In line with the literature we expect negative relationship between uniqueness 
and leverage. Unfortunately, the definition of uniqueness differs between Sweden and 
the two other countries. While the variable for U.K. and U.S. firms is defined as the 
ratio of research and development to sales, the measure for Sweden is simply the 
wage level. This is assumed to be a proxy for the knowledge capital. 
Uniqueness does not appear to be a significant factor determining leverage for 
listed firms in Sweden and the U.K. The parameter estimate is -0.05 for Swedish 
firms and 0.12 for U.K. firms, but it is not significantly different from zero in both 
cases. In contrast, the coefficient for the U.S. is statistically significant and 
surprisingly the sign is positive.  The American security holders do not hesitate to 
invest in R&D-intensive firms. The intangible nature of the uniqueness variable does 
not seem to worry credit providers in the U.S. that the firm will be unable to cover its 
interest payments.  
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5.16 Tangibility  
It is easier for the lender to establish the value of tangible rather than intangible 
assets because typically there is more asymmetric information about the value of 
intangibles. Moreover, in the event of bankruptcy, intangible assets such as goodwill 
and structural capital will rapidly disappear, thus reducing the net worth of a firm and 
further accelerating the possibility of bankruptcy. And as reported in Section 2, in 
economies with less developed financial markets collateral is more essential to obtain 
outside financing), compared with the most advanced financial systems. Thus, firms 
with a greater percentage of their total assets composed of tangible assets is supposed 
to have a higher capacity for raising debt, and we assume that this variable is more 
important in Sweden than in the U.K and the U.S. 
This is also completely confirmed by the results. Expressing tangibility as fixed 
assets to total assets the parameter estimate is positively and statistically highly 
significant for Sweden, and the size is 0.35. The coefficient is positive but 
insignificant for the U.S. and negative and insignificant in the case of the U.K.  
5.17 Firm size 
A large firm is typically more diversified and could therefore be assumed to face a 
lower probability of bankruptcy. One would thus expect that the larger the firm size 
the higher the optimal debt capacity. The size measure used is employment. 
The size coefficient is positive and highly significant in Sweden, positive and 
significant in the U.K., but negative and highly significant in the U.S. The results are 
consistent with the theoretical prediction when Sweden and the U.K. are considered. 
The unexpected sign for U.S. firms could possibly mean that small firms use venture 
capital (which is a mixture between arm’s-lengths relation based external capital) to a 
larger extent than firms in Europe to finance their initial growth, but use bank 
financing for subsequent growth and then increase their leverage. However, the size 
of the parameter estimates is small for all three countries: Sweden (0.07), U.K (0.02) 
and U.S (-0.04). 
5.18 Unobserved time-specific effects and industry- specific effects 
The unobserved time-specific effects in the model are represented by time-
dummy variables. A presence of significant time effects can be interpreted as 
meaning that there are unobserved heterogeneous time-specific and time-invariant 
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effects that are not captured by the seven observable explanatory variables. In 
addition to time-dummy variables, the three samples contain a set of industry-dummy 
variables to capture unobservable effects that are common to all firms. The regression 
results show that the unobserved time-specific and industry specific effects have 
strong explanatory power only for Sweden.  
 
5.2 Speed of adjustment and the difference between observed and optimal ratio  
5.21 Speed of adjustment 
Panel B of Table 4 presents the speed of adjustment towards optimal capital 
structure. The determinants are (a) absolute distance towards the target, (b) growth 
rate, (c) firm size, and  (d) unobserved time-specific effects.  
Only the parameter estimate for unobservable time specific effects is significant 
when Sweden is considered.  Interestingly they indicate that the speed of adjustment 
goes from positive and significant in the beginning of the 1990s to negative and 
significant at the end of the decade.8 The economic interpretation of these results is as 
follows: The speed of adjustment towards optimal leverage increased at the end of the 
deep recession, 1991-1993, and the average listed firm experienced an overshooting 
of its target in the strong boom period, while in the second half of the 1990s firms 
responded with a downward adjustment. 
For both the U.K. and the U.S. coefficients for expected growth are negative and 
statistically significant. This means that firms with higher growth opportunities adjust 
more slowly towards the optimal capital structure, which is quite surprising. The 
result does not lend support to the commonly held view that growing firms find it 
easier to change their capital structure by altering the composition of the new capital 
they raise. The U.K. and U.S. coefficients for size are positive and significant, 
indicating that large firms are more concerned about capital structure than small 
firms. The parameter estimate for the distance variable is significant only for firms in 
the U.K. and the sign is negative. This indicates that it is less costly to adjust by 
relatively small amounts. A small adjustment can be achieved as part of a firm’s 
normal operations, while larger adjustments require new issues of securities.  
                                                 
8 Since the time and industry dummies are not identically defined between the three 
countries, the parameter estimates are not reported in any of the tables. 
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The coefficients for time-specific effects of the U.K. firms are negative and 
significantly different from zero throughout the period considered. The economic 
meaning is that the U.K. firms were in a downward adjustment process for the whole 
period. The U.S. time-dummy parameter estimates also indicate a weakly downward 
adjustment process.  
5.22 Observed and optimal leverage 
The cross-country comparison using market value leverage concludes with an 
analysis of the ratio of mean values of the optimal leverage ( *L ), and the observed 
leverage ( L ), which will be expressed as the ratio )/( * LL , and the adjustment speed 
( δ ).   
The annual rate of adjustment toward optimal capital structure for Swedish listed 
firms reported in Table 5 varied between 8% and 14% between 1992 and 1998. The 
optimality ratio was improving during the 1990s and approached unity at the end of 
the period, (( LL /∗ ) → 1), although the process is not unequivocal.  
The parameter estimates for the U.K. show that the optimality ratio for the mean 
firm is frequently different from the target. In general, the U.K. firms seem to be 
over-leveraged and the annual rate of adjustment varied between 11% and 65% 
between 1991 and 1996. The U.S. firms are close to optimal leverage for the entire 
period under consideration.  
The overshooting of the optimal debt level by Swedish firms in 1992, and the 
structural overshot in the U.S. for the whole period except for 1993 deserve some 
more attention. The downturn in Swedish business cycle pre-1992-period resulted in 
low demand and creation of overcapacity in production. Given fixed capital and a 
rigid labor market combined with low profitability made the optimal leverage exceed 
the observed level. However, over time the optimality ratio declined as firm’s 
profitability increased and more internal resources were used. The continuous 
overshooting in the US might reflect the increasing optimality and the need for 
expansion as a result of positive growth rates in the US economy throughout the 
1990s. 
 
5.3 Non-listed firm versus listed firms 
The result section concludes by considering listed and mainly large firms and 
small non listed firms in Sweden.  Comparing their book-value leverage table 6 
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shows large dissimilarities.  In fact the book-value measure for the non-listed firms 
seems to be more comparable with the market value measure for listed firms, 
reflecting that managers in the listed firms are most concerned over the market value 
leverage, while the listed firms have no alternative to book value leverage.  
While non-debt tax shields, income variability, profitability uniqueness, and  
tangibility have more or less the same impact on capital structure, using different 
definitions on leverage for the both categories of firms, growth opportunities and size 
are conflicting variables. However, although the signs are the opposite and both 
estimate are highly significant, the order of magnitude of the coefficient for growth 
opportunity is approximately zero for both categories of firms. Firms expecting 
higher growth do not change their mix of debt and equity in the focused measure of 
leverage.  The parameter estimate for size is only weakly significant and the order of 
magnitude nearly zero for the small firms. Probably this reflects that a  large part of 
the firms are very small (1-10 employees) and that the variation is size is limited. 
Contrary to listed firms (and market value leverage) distance to optimal leverage has 
a positive impact on the speed of adjustment for non-listed firms, but not for listed 
firms. This indicates a positive association between the gap between optimal and 
observed leverage ratios and the speed at which the firm might fill the non-optimality 
gap.  
The conclusion here is that although both categories of firms have different 
conditions on the capital market, collateral dominates as the signaling information for 
raising external funds (issuing debt) and the inverse measure for the importance of 
corporate taxes (non-debt tax shields) has a strong explanatory power for increasing 
the leverage. Further, both listed and non-listed firms did make use of profitability to 
increase the equity, through retired earnings and in the case of listed firms raising 
funds from the stock market. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper examined whether firms in different financial systems share same 
determinants of the capital structure. We used a methodological approach recently 
developed to estimate a dynamic specification and allowing for adjustment of the 
capital structure over time. 
Our analysis provides evidence that the size of the financial sector, the supply of 
equity capital and different systems of taxation result in different behavior concerning 
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optimization of capital structure. Although the firms are frequently not on their target 
level, the deviation is smaller for the highly equity dependent U.S firms. They also 
adjust faster towards the optimal structure compared with the debt dependent Swedish 
firms. However, the also highly equity financed U.K. firms are further away from the 
target than Swedish firms, but facing lower costs to adjust towards the target. 
For both categories of Swedish firms considered, listed and mainly large and non 
listed small firms, physical capital as a security and corporate taxes (due to deduct 
interest rates as an expense) were found to be the two main determinants to increased 
leverage. On the contrary, and quite surprisingly, the most important reason for 
increased leverage in the U.S was growth opportunities and uniqueness. This can 
partly be explained by the financial regulation in the 1990s, which encouraged the 
low leveraged firms with promising growth perspective to borrow more from 
competing banks. The well informed insiders knowledge about the (undervalued) 
value of the existing stock has probably played a role as well. Moreover, and very 
important, the positive sign for growth opportunities and uniqueness in the U.S. may 
also be an indicator of a strong signal value of intangible capital such as R&D and 
knowledge.  
One key objective of this paper was to investigate whether particular financial 
institutions or their efficiency have an impact on investments contributing to 
technological change, profitability and growth. The literature stresses the importance 
of future oriented investment in this respect. Based on our results a tentative answer is 
yes in the cases of Sweden and the U.S, and no in the case of U.K.  The combination 
of a large size of the financial market and a broader variety through an extensive 
stock market, increased competition in the bank sector and a growing venture capital 
market creates favorable conditions for in intangible investments in the U.S. The 
financial market in neither Sweden (bank dominated) nor U.K. (equity dominated) 
does strongly favor a dynamic development of the economy driven by technological 
change and creative destruction. 
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Table 1: The Size of financial markets 
Panel A: External capital markets at the aggregate level: Median values 
 (a)External 
Capital/GNP 
(b) Domestic 
Firms/ Population 
(c) IPO/ 
Population 
(d) Debt/GDP  
Finland 0.25 13.00 0.60 0.75 
France 0.23 8.05 0.17 0.96 
Germany 0.13 5.14 0.08 1.12 
Italy 0.08 3.91 0.31 0.55 
Sweden 0.51 12.66 1.66 0.55 
U.K 1.00 35.68 2.01 1.13 
U.S 0.58 30.11 3.11 0.81 
Tot 49 countriesi 0.40 21.59 1.02 0.59 
Panel B: External funding at the firm level: Median values 
 (e) Market  
Capital/ Sales 
(f) Market Cap/ 
Sales-Flow 
(g) Debt/Sales (h) Debt/Cash 
Flow 
Finland 0.30 2.90 0.31 2.58 
France 0.29 4.28 0.19 2.36 
Germany 0.21 3.29 0.10 1.24 
Italy 0.17 2.21 0.32 3.04 
Sweden 0.40 3.10 0.21 1.59 
U.K 0.64 5.77 0.11 1.06 
U.S 0.67 6.70 0.18 1.86 
Tot 49 countriesi 0.58 4.77 0.27 2.24 
Notes: (a) The ratio of stock market capitalization held by minorities to gross national product for 
1994. 
(b) Ratio of the number of domestic listed firms in a given country to its population in million 
for the period 1995:7-1996:6. 
(c)Initial public offerings of equity in a given country to its population. 
(d) Ratio of the sum of bank debt of the private sector and outstanding nonfinancial bonds to 
GDP in 1994 or last available. 
(e) The median ratio of stock market capitalization held by minorities to sales in 1994 for all 
nonfinancial firms. 
(f) The median ratio of the stock market capitalization held by minorities to cash flow in 1994 
for all nonfinacial firms. 
(g) Median of the total-debt-to-sale in 1994 for all firms. 
(h)Median of the total-debt-to-cash-flow ratio for all firms. 
(i) Sample average 
Source: La Porta et al (1997)  
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Table 2: Market value and book value of equity 1991-1998. 
Total Sample of Firms Listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 1991-1998 
(NT=1,179) 
 Market value 
of equity 
 
Book value 
of equity 
 
Total debt 
 
 
Market value 
leverage 
Book value 
leverage 
Year Mean Index Mean Index Debt Index Mean Mean 
         
1991 3601 100 2597 100 6098 100 63% 70% 
1992 3875 108 2690 104 6431 105 62% 71% 
1993 5554 154 2798 108 6222 102 53% 69% 
1994 5366 149 2837 109 5000 82 48% 64% 
1995 6095 169 3338 129 5205 85 46% 61% 
1996 9139 254 3997 154 5815 95 39% 59% 
1997 10230 284 4090 157 5891 97 37% 59% 
1998 6886 191 2905 112 4630 76 40% 61% 
Note:  Market value of leverage = (debt/(debt + market value of equity)). Book value leverage = 
(debt/(debt + book value of equity)  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the data 
Unbalanced panel (NTi = 813) 
Variable Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum 
Book value % 0.602 0.179 0.010 1.000 
Market value % 0.525 0.235 0.010 0.988 
Non-debt tax shields % 0.039 0.026 0.000 0.303 
Income variability % 11.520 3.720 1.231 21.937 
Expected growth, % 3.512 25.288 -100.000 88.927 
Profitability 1) 0.025 0.098 -1.328 0.268 
Uniqueness % 0.054 0.338 0.000 8.578 
Tangibility % 0.535 0.257 0.000 0.993 
Size sales 1) 6.915 2.557 0.000 11.705 
Size employment 7185 15950 1 121148 
Size employment 7185 15950 1 121148 
Note:  (1) Million Swedish Crowns 
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 Table 4.  Parameter estimates of the dynamic capital structure model. Determinants of 
optimal leverage defined as market value leverage and the adjustment speed 
towards the target 
Variable Expected  
sign 
Sweden U.K. U.S 
  Coeff S.E Sig. Coeff S.E Sig. Coeff S.E Sig. 
Panel A: 
Optimal leverage 
         
NDTS  ( - ) -3.79 1.39 *** -0.25 0.52  0.23 0.15  
VARI  ( - ) -0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.28  -0.35 0.21 * 
GROW ( ± ) 0.02 0.00 *** -0.60 0.44  0.94 0.02 *** 
PROF  ( ± ) -2.66 0.48 *** -0.64 0.12 *** 0.13 0.08  
UNIQ  ( - ) -0.05 0.07  0.12 0.57  0.26 0.13 ** 
TANG  ( + ) 0.35 0.12 *** -0.06 0.09  0.05 0.06  
SIZE  ( - ) 0.07 0.02 *** 0.02 0.01 ** -0.04 0.00 *** 
MILL’S  -0.04 0.01 ***    -   
Dummies           
Industry    Yes   Yes   Yes  
Time   Yes   Yes   Yes  
           
Panel B: 
Adjustment speed 
         
DIST  0.01 0.01  -8.68 2.54 *** 0.00 0.00  
GROWTH  0.00 0.00  -0.28 0.13 ** -0.18 0.01 *** 
SIZE  0.00 0.00  0.04 0.02 * 0.01 0.00 ** 
R2 adjusted  0.88   0.80   0.87   
RMSE  0.09   0.06   0.06   
Notes:  Sweden: Unbalanced panel 1991-1998, 117-221 observations per year. U. K.: Balanced 
panel 1990-1996, 122 observations. U. S.: Balanced panel 1989-1996, 438 observations. 
Expected signs in parentheses.  The parameter estimate for the selection effect, Mill*s ratio, 
is negative and significant at the 1% level of significance for Sweden. 
  Panel A:  
  NDTS: non-debt tax shields, VARI: Income variability. GROW: Expected growth. PROF: 
Profitability. UNIQ: Uniqueness TANG: Tangibility. SIZE: Firm size. 
  Panel B:  
  DIST: Absolutely distance to optimal  capital structure. Positive coefficient indicates that it 
is costly to adjust by relatively small amounts.  
  GROWTH: Expected growth. Positive coefficient indicates that firms with growth 
opportunity adjust faster towards the optimal capital structure.  
  SIZE:  Positive sign indicates that large firms adjust faster toward the target. 
Source:  The results for U.K and for U.S is from Banjerjee, Heshmati Wihlborg (2000) 
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Table 5. Optimality Ratio: Estimated optimal leverage ( *
it
L ) over observed leverage 
(
it
L ), and annual rate adjustment speed (δ) towards optimal leverage. 
 Listed firms Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. 
Year Sweden U.K. U.S. 
 LL /∗  δ  LL /∗  δ  LL /∗  δ  
1990 - - - - 1.07 0.26 
1991 - - 0.75 0.65 1.06 0.22 
1992 1.26 0.10 0.81 0.22 1.07 0.32 
1993 0.26 0.16 0.64 0.31 1.00 0.25 
1994 0.63 0.08 0.63 0.26 1.06 0.27 
1995 1.00 0.13 0.82 0.11 1.14 0.30 
1996 0.42 0.11 1.12 0.13 1.09 0.24 
1997 1.04 0.12 - - - - 
1998 1.00 0.00 - - - - 
Notes: Sweden: Unbalanced panel 1991-1998, 117-221 observations per year. U. K.: Balanced 
panel 1990-1996, 122 observations.   U. S.: Balanced panel 1989-1996, 438 observations 
Source:  The results for U.K and for U.S is from Banjerjee, Heshmati Wihlborg (2000) 
 
Table 6. Parameter estimates of the dynamic structure model. The elasticity of 
leverage defined as book value and the adjustment speed. Swedish firms 
Variable Statistic Expected 
Sign 
Sweden Non 
listed 
 Sweden 
Listed 
 
Panel A:  
Optimal leverage 
     
  Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
NDTS  ( - ) -0.59 *** 2.62 * 
VARI  ( - ) -1.49  0.10 ** 
GROW ( ± ) -0.01 *** 0.00  
PROF  ( ± ) -0.84 *** 2.00 *** 
UNIQ  ( - ) -0.48  -0.13 ** 
TANG  ( + ) 0.23 *** -0.17  
SIZE  ( - ) -0.02 * -0.12 * 
MILL’S  -0.09  -0.06 *** 
Dummies  Yes  Coeff.  
Industry  Yes  Coeff.  
Time      
Panel B: 
Adjustment speed 
     
DIST  0.59 *** 0.10 *** 
GROWTH  -0.01 *** 0.00  
SIZE  0.01 * 0.01 *** 
R2 adj  0.63  0.81  
RMSE  0.11  0.08  
Source:  The results for non listed firms are from Heshmati (2002) 
